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Abstract
This article examines the basic economics of scholarly publications, especially technical
journals, and applies this model to the consequences of low-cost electronic publication.  The article
discusses the demand for scholarly publication:  dissemination of new information to students, other
researchers and professional users outside the educational community; reputation development by
scholars and research institutions;  and the evaluation of research personnel by peers and superiors.
The key supply feature of scholarly publication is that some uses are public goods, and others have
strong economies of scale.  Electronic publication reduces duplication and storage costs, but does
not have much of an effect on fixed costs, and so is a minor technological change purely from the
perspective of costs.  However, electronic publication is a major change in two respects:  it radically
alters the relative costs of enhancements to straight textual material, and so may change the content
of publications, and it dramatically reduces the cost of unauthorized duplication.  The article focuses
on the latter problem, and explores some of its possible consequences.1
The Economics of Scholarly Publications and the Information Superhighway
Electronic technology offers many interesting opportunities for lowering the costs, increasing
the variety, and speeding the dissemination of scholarly publications.  Unfortunately, electronic
publication also presents some new problems, and aggravates others.  Specifically, because
electronic duplication is much cheaper than duplication of hard copies, in the absence of effective
methods for preventing unauthorized use electronic distribution can reduce the economic viability
of scholarly publications, and lead to less, rather than more, effective dissemination of new
knowledge.   The purpose of this essay is briefly to describe the economics of scholarly publication
and how it may be affected by electronic distribution.
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The structure of the essay is as follows.  First, a basic model of demand and supply in
markets for scholarly publication is developed, including the entry process for new publishers of
books and journals.  Next, the effect of illegal duplication on this market is explored.  Then, the
economic and technical characteristics of electronic publication are examined, including their likely
effect on the market that has developed using traditional technology.  Finally, some conclusions are
offered about the likely effect of new technology on scholarly publication, the dissemination of
research, and university libraries.
I.  The Sources of Demand
Scholarly publications serve several distinct uses, each of which in some measure creates of
demand for scholarly books and journals.2
One function of scholarly publications is the dissemination of information, ranging from
fundamental new concepts to cleverly organized aggregations of old data. Scholars frequently
minimize the importance of this use of scholarly publications because, by the time scholarly works
are published, they are often outdated as representations of the current research frontier.  Research
scholars tend to rely primarily on preprints, seminars and conference for information about the latest
advancements in scholarly knowledge.  
Nevertheless, dissemination through publication is very important for practitioners and
students.  In scholarly fields with extensive practical uses, such as science, engineering, finance and
law, scholarly publications are relied upon extensively in industry and government to guide
applications.  For these users, whether a publication contains results at today's frontier of knowledge
is not valued as highly as among research scholars.  Scholarly publications are also useful in
educating students.  As in more applied research, most education is not focused on the current
frontier of research, even at the graduate level.   Consequently, scholarly publications are intensively
used for advanced undergraduate and graduate education.  Furthermore, even if scholars rarely use
publications to learn about new developments in their research specialties, they do use them to keep
abreast of developments in other fields.
Another function of scholarly publication is as a tool for evaluating researchers.  The
advantage of scholarly publication is that the prepublication review process and subsequent citations
(as an indicator of impact) are important sources of information about scholarly standing.  In
addition, the hierarchy of journals also generates signals about the quality of scholarly work that
facilitates dissemination and evaluation.  The scholarly publication process is used as a screening3
mechanism to enable researchers to allocate their searching and reading time more efficiently.
Both of these factors cause scholarly publications to have an economic value.  Scholars
derive value from a more efficient process for evaluating and disseminating their work, universities
derive value from the improvements in their evaluation process that are made possible by scholarly
publications, and students, other scholars, and participants in the private economy derive benefit
from the dissemination functions of scholarly publications.  But all of these sources of value have
public goods properties:  that is, to an individual, the benefits of the process do not depend fully on
whether a subscription is actually purchased.  For example, scholars and universities derive the
benefits of evaluation and prestige that flow from the dissemination of a publication, regardless of
whether either buy it.  One employee of a high-technology firm can make use of an engineering
journal that was bought by another employee, or by a nearby library.
Because of this "public good" feature of scholarly publication, each beneficiary has some
incentive to "free ride" -- not to pay a "fair share" of the costs of scholarly publications.  As a result,
the effective demand for scholarly journals -- the actual response in the market to the introduction
of a publication of a given quality that is offered at a given price -- is likely to be an underestimate
of the true economic benefits, as measured by the aggregate maximum willingness to pay.
The preceding argument supports the tentative conclusion that scholarly publication is likely
to be undersupplied, a conclusion that is at variance with the commonly held opinion that many
scholarly publications have little or no value.  (The conclusion is tentative because assessing the
efficiency of  scholarly publication requires consideration of costs, which are examined in the next
section.)  The contrary argument runs something like this.  First, most scholarly publications are4
simply not read by more than a handful of people, and are never again cited by anyone other than the
author, who presumably did not need to have the work published in order to know about it and to
cite it.   Second, many people express the belief that scholars place too much emphasis on research
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and not enough on teaching, university service, being good citizens, parents, and spouses, etc.  Third,
because scholars do not bear the full cost of publication, they can be expected to overuse it.
These arguments are incomplete.  Some of the purposes of scholarly publication do not
depend on attracting readers.  In particular, the signal "published, not cited" is different than
"published, cited" and "failed to be published."  In addition, the likely impact of a scholarly work can
not be perfectly anticipated in the review process.  If peer assessments of submitted manuscripts are
subject to significant random error, the expected number of readers and citations can be positive at
the time of publication, even if, ex post, the median number of readers and citations is zero.  If
scholars knew in advance which of their works were unimportant, or if peer review were perfect, a
reduction in publication could be accomplished with zero social cost;  however, with imperfect ex
ante assessments, if one observed a circumstance in which all publications were widely read and
cited, the number of publications would assuredly be too few.
Finally, whereas scholars do not bear the full cost of publication (although in the sciences
they frequently bear a part of it), publishers do -- and find it worthwhile.  Moreover, the cost of
publication represents a relatively small fraction of the social cost of producing and disseminating
research.  Scholars, their employers and other sponsors of research bear a very large fraction of the
total costs of scholarly work in terms of the opportunity costs of the time spent undertaking the
research and writing the manuscript.5
Of course, a comprehensive assessment of the extent of scholarly publications requires
consideration of costs and the mechanics of the market for scholarly publications.  But with respect
to the efficiency of the scope of scholarly publications, two important facts are important.  First,
many specialized journals that are infrequently cited pass a market test, especially in technical fields.
Moreover, in technical fields, a significant share of this market is accounted for by libraries and
employees of government and industrial laboratories.  Second, judging from such factors as citations
and appearances on reading lists, the best articles in secondary journals and books from secondary
publishers have substantially more impact than the worst publications from the most prestigious
sources, supporting the view that ex ante assessments of the significance of scholarly works are
subject to substantial uncertainty.  Hence, the notion that a reduction in the number of scholarly
publications would eliminate only the least valuable material is clearly optimistic.
II.  The Supply of Scholarly Publications
Like all information products, the supply of scholarly publications can be separated
conceptually into two distinct components:  (1) the production of the basic information product (in
this case, the edited, formatted and composited publication);  and (2) the duplication and
dissemination of this product (in traditional technology, printing and shipping).  In addition, the
supplier undertakes marketing costs.
The first component is called the "first-copy costs."  Among the first-copy costs are the work
of the author in producing a manuscript and the work of editorial personnel in evaluating it and
preparing it for publication.  For scholarly publications, the first-copy costs include all of the6
research by the scholar plus refereeing and editing.
The most important feature of information products is that the magnitude of first-copy costs
is independent of the second stage costs.  That is, the cost of the content of the publication is
independent of how many copies are produced.  To a rough approximation, then, the costs of an
information product can be decomposed into a linear function:
(1) C = F + mq,
where C is total cost, F is the first-copy cost, m is the cost of producing and distributing one more
copy of the published product (the marginal cost of a copy), and q is the number of copies that are
produced and distributed.  This simple representation has only two important complications that need
to be noted, but that subsequently will be ignored to simplify the argument.
First, for most publications, the number of copies produced exceeds the number of copies that
are distributed.  The cause of excess production is uncertainty about final demand.  For reasons that
are explained below, the price of a publication is usually substantially higher than the marginal cost
of production.  Consequently, the publisher will print one more copy if the probability of selling it
is reasonably high but less than one.  Hence, the optimal printing run is usually higher than the
expected number of sales.  This phenomenon adds complexity to the conceptual model of the supply
of information products, but does not really affect the core conclusions.
Second, marketing costs do not fit neatly into either first-copy costs or duplication and
dissemination costs.  Indeed, marketing costs have elements of both.  Some aspects of marketing are7
like first-copy costs:  preparing the promotional material.  Other aspects are more directly related to
the quantity sold in that the intensity of advertising is positively related to the number of copies sold.
Hence, both F and m in (1) contain marketing elements.
The most important implication for all information products that is derived from this generic
characterization of costs is that for a publication to be economically viable, the price of a copy must
exceed the marginal cost of production.  That is, total revenues must generally not fall below total
costs in order for a publisher to survive in the market.  Hence, if P is the price of the publication, it
must be true that:
(2) P > F/q + m.
This basic formula is somewhat more complicated if the publication sells advertising, but not greatly
so.  Typically, advertising rates depend on the size of the ad, the location of the ad in the publication,
and the circulation of the publication, so that the price on the left-hand side of (2) can be
decomposed into two elements, the subscription price and the advertising prices for each size and
location of ad.  Thus, if there are k types of ads, P can b rewritten as:
(3) P = P  + P Q  + ... + P Q , s1 1 k k
where the first term on the right-hand side of (3) represents the price charged to consumers, the
remaining P's represent the prices per subscriber for various types of ads, and the Q's represent the8
number of ads that are sold.  This complication does not alter the basic fact that the revenues per
copy from all sources must exceed the marginal cost of producing one more unit.
One important reality about all products that have this kind of cost function (including
broadcasting and all other information products) is that the most efficient pricing system is not
consistent with the financial viability of the product for a private producer.   Neither subscriptions
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nor advertising can be priced at marginal cost;  together they must generate enough revenues to cover
the first-copy costs (F in equations (1) and (2)) if the publication is to be financially viable.  By
setting price above marginal cost, however, some potential subscribers must be excluded who
otherwise could be provided an incremental copy of the publication at a price that exceeded its
marginal cost.  The necessity to exclude such subscribers in order to cover total costs constitutes a
fundamental efficiency problem for all private markets for information.  This problem can only be
solved by subsidy.
Another important implication of this general cost function is that the price of a publication,
all else equal, is likely to increase if circulation falls.  A drop in circulation is likely to cause a drop
in advertising revenues but a less than proportionate drop in costs because the first-copy costs must
still be covered.  Hence, subscription revenues per subscriber must cover a higher fraction of total
costs.  While the actual pricing effect depends on the precise way in which demand for the
publication declines, the most common case is that a fall in demand leaves the publication with
buyers who value it most highly, and have less price-sensitive (less elastic) demand, in which case
the price will increase (or, in some cases, the material will not be published).
Scholarly publication differs from commercial publication in a number of important ways.9
Most importantly, scholarly publications are not expected to cover the parts of the first-copy costs
that represent the effort of the author.  Research and writing costs are paid by the author's employer
and, in some cases, a grantor or even the author.  Although book publishers usually pay royalties,
on average these are very small compared to the first-copy costs of research and manuscript
preparation, and are not the primary source of the author's motivation to publish.  In addition, some
scholarly publishers are subsidized by universities, professional associations and foundations.
Hence, the costs that they must cover may be less than the fixed and marginal costs of publication
and distribution.
In many cases, scholarly publications impose charges on the author.  One form is a
submission fee, and another is a page charge.  In addition, some scholarly publications require that
manuscripts be submitted in machine-readable form, or that tables and figures be submitted in a form
that is ready for photo-offset printing.  These requirements are equivalent to a publication charge in
that they shift some of the first-copy costs to the author.  Thus, the simple formula in (2) requires
further amendment for some journals to take into account these other forms of revenues.
Entry and exit of publications is determined by whether the maximum feasible incremental
revenues from a publication enable it to cover its total costs.  Imagine that all scholarly publication
were controlled a by a monopolist.   In considering whether to publish one more book or to add one
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more scholarly journal, the monopolist would inquire whether the increment to revenues would
exceed the increment to costs arising from the additional publication.  In making this calculation,
the monopolist would consider whether the new publication caused some customers to switch from
another publication.  The monopolist would "count" only those revenues of a new publication that10
were generated by a net increase in purchases;  it would ignore revenues that represented a
substitution of the new for the old.  By contrast, a second firm contemplating a new publication
would count as incremental any revenue that shifted from another publisher.  The decline in revenues
and, hence, profits suffered by the first publisher would be irrelevant to the assessment of the
desirability of an additional publication by the second publisher.  This basic logic is the basis for a
conceptual understanding of the process that determines the number of scholarly books and journals
that are published.  To some extent, publications within a given discipline or field of research are
substitutes.  An increase in total publications will reduce the sales and average revenues of
publications in the field.
The markets for journals are especially interesting in their dynamics.  Initially, journals were
few in number and generally covered entire disciplines, reflecting the relatively small demand that
supported the market.  As time progressed, more scholars sought publication, and rejection rates
increased.  The established journals experienced increased circulation and revenues.  In practice, the
initial monopoly suppliers -- usually, professional associations and university presses -- could have
responded by expanding the number of journals, but typically they did not.  Instead, they increased
rejection rates to improve the quality of their publications.  In some cases the initial publishers used
the increased profits from journals to subsidize other activities of professional associations.
Consequently, excess demand for new publications grew, broadening the process of assessment of
scholars and allowing easier and broader dissemination of work that was thought to have value but
was rejected by the established journals.
Initially, entry took the form of more general purpose journals, but the reputation and first-in11
advantage of the established general disciplinary journals prevented entrants from achieving
circulation that was equivalent to their competitors.  Eventually, entry began to take the form of
specialized journals, largely because of the character of demand.  Individuals and corporate
laboratories, contemplating the choice between the fifth or sixth best general purpose journal (with
relatively few articles in the special field most relevant to the subscriber) and a specialized journal
in the relevant field, would tend to pick the latter.  Likewise, authors, while preferring the prestige
of a top-ranking general purpose journal, sought to target their other publications in journals that
would be read by the most people in their fields, rather than skimmed or skipped by a general
audience.  Hence, for journals of lesser quality, specialization came to be dominant.  The
phenomenon has come to be called "journal proliferation," referring to the tendency for new journals
to come into the market to serve narrower and narrower specialties as research volume increased.
The effect of journal entry is to reduce average circulation among older journals, since each
journal derives some of its subscribers from individuals and institutions that cancel other
subscriptions in order to free funds to buy the newcomer.  And, as circulation declines, the average
cost of older journals increases.  Moreover, in the case of all but the general circulation journals, the
remaining demand for the older journals typically becomes less price sensitive (less elastic).  Each
specialized journal increasingly relies on a subscriber base of narrow specialists for whom the
journal represents the best way to reach other similar specialists among journals lacking the prestige
of the leading general journals.  Hence, as more journals enter, prices for established journals
generally increase.
By the late 1980s, the process had created literally thousands of journals with relatively low12
circulation, numbering a few hundred subscribers.   For example, imagine a journal that does not
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require an especially fancy publication process (e.g., no color photos, or complex figures).  If the
journal publishes about 150 pages per issue, it will face a marginal cost of printing and distribution
in the range of $2 to $4 per issue, or, for four issues per year, of $8 to $16.  Its first-copy costs will
be in the range of $50,000 to $100,000, depending on whether the editor and referees are paid, and
on the extent of copy editing and proof reading.  If it has a circulation of 400 (roughly the median
for scholarly journals), the first-copy costs per subscriber will be between $125 and $250;  Hence,
its subscription price must be far in excess of marginal costs in order for the journal to survive.  Note
that in this example, a fall in circulation has very little effect on costs, and so mainly causes an
increase in the minimum viable price for the journal.
In addition, because the gap between minimum viable price and marginal cost is so large, the
market for low-circulation journals is likely to be highly inefficient, with many potential subscribers
excluded.  Publishers deal with this problem to some extent by attempting to discriminate between
individual and institutional subscribers.  Frequently, individual subscriptions are as little as ten
percent of the institutional price, and frequently are in the range of one-fourth to one-third.  But even
so, individual prices are usually substantially above marginal costs.  In addition, the high institutional
price causes institutional libraries to be far smaller than would be socially optimal.  Of course, for
publications in science and engineering, this inefficiency ripples throughout the entire economy, for
it means that education, applied research and development, and direct diffusion to the production of
goods and services will proceed at a slower rate than otherwise would be the case.
The phenomenon of declining average circulation and rising prices has placed increasing13
pressure on general purpose libraries, such as libraries at universities and colleges.  The combined
effect of more journals and, due to declining average circulation, higher prices led to rapidly rising
costs of maintaining a comprehensive library of scholarly journals.  Many commentators interpreted
these developments as representing monopolistic practices publishers.   First, the price increases
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were said to represent monopoly pricing.  Second, journal proliferation was explained by the practice
of publishers inducing undeserved subscriptions by paying leading scholars to lend their names to
unimportant new journals as editors.
In practice, neither explanation is a fully consistent explanation.  Journals may have market
power, but there is no reason to believe that it has increased, and in any case declining average
circulation of journals is sufficient to explain the pricing phenomenon.  Likewise, the identification
of a journal with a famous scholar is undoubtedly beneficial for its initial marketing, but if it did not
contain material that was useful for dissemination purposes (and did not generate citations), it would
not generate permanent subscribers.  Industry would not subscribe, and universities would not face
resistance to canceling subscriptions, if neither faculty nor students wanted access to it.  This,
identification with a famous scholar might shift high-quality articles among journals, but it can not
explain the increase in the total number of financially viable publications.  The latter is due to the
increase in the number of useful publications, which in turn reflects the persistent rise in the number
of researchers and real expenditures on scholarly research.
Libraries have responded to price increases and journal proliferation by cutting back on
subscriptions and placing greater reliance on interlibrary loan.  For any single library, this strategy
makes sense if a journal is not frequently used.  For a few dollars, a request for a journal can be14
satisfied by interlibrary loan, and a faculty member or student can legally photocopy the desired
article.  If such a request occurs only a few times a year, the library can save several hundreds of
dollars in subscription costs (plus a few more in journal storage costs) for an outlay of tens of dollars
in the interlibrary loan process.
Unfortunately, for all libraries taken together, this process probably does not reduce total
costs, and may even increase them.  The reason is that only a very small part of the costs of a journal
are related to the marginal cost of adding one more subscriber.  The savings to the publisher is not
the hundreds of dollars for the subscription, but the few dollars in printing and distributing one more
copy.  Hence, the total effect of interlibrary loan on all libraries is to raise their aggregate costs by
increasing journal prices and causing libraries to incur the added costs of interlibrary loan (including
additional photocopying).  For publications that are used with some frequency, the savings from
lower distribution costs are not likely to offset that additional costs of interlibrary loan.
Consequently, the perfectly rational strategy for each library is collectively irrational:  it reduces the
quality of library services and has no significant effect on costs (and may increase them).
III.  Illegal Copying
The economics of illegal copying of scholarly publications fits nicely into the supply and
demand model presented in the preceding discussion.  The cost of illegal duplication is the sum of
the direct cost of producing a copy (c), the fine for being caught (f) times the probability of detection
(p), and the psychic disutility from engaging in illegal behavior (d).   Hence, a person will engage
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in illegal copying rather than acquiring a personal copy if:15
(4) P > c + pf + d.
The extent of illegal duplication will change if any of these factors changes.   Assume for
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purposes of discussion that two of these factors are fixed:  the fine for illegal copying and the
personal distaste for illegal activity.  This assumption enables us to focus on the effects of events that
might affect the other elements of (4).
Clearly, the trend in rising journal prices can be expected to increase illegal copying.  If (4)
is not satisfied only because P is slightly too low, and increase in P will cause a change in behavior,
from subscribing to copying illegally.  Hence, the fall in average circulation from journal
proliferation eventually leads to a further fall in average circulation because the proportion of users
who gain access through illegal copying increases.  Because libraries are more likely than individuals
to be caught and fined if they copy illegally, price increases are likely to cause the proportion of
subscriptions accounted for by institutions to increase.  This process further increases the cost of
general purpose research libraries, and intensifies the gap between the individual and collective
rationality of sharing arrangements between libraries.
In similar fashion, a fall in the real price or an increase in the quality of copying also
increases illegal duplication.  Here the most important technological events that have taken place to
date are the invention and subsequent improvement of photocopying.  Prior to photocopies, illegal
duplication required a form of publication.  Although illegal publication could be of somewhat lower
quality, the main saving was to avoid the editorial and marketing costs, and in the case of books
royalties to authors.  The illegal duplicator still had to pay for preparing the material for publication,16
then printing and distributing it.  Because the duplicator did not offer much in cost saving, illegal
duplication of scholarly works was rare.
The introduction of photocopying vastly reduced the costs of duplication by eliminating the
first-copy costs of the process.  It also vastly increased the problem of detecting illegal copying, so
reduced pf as well as c in (4).  Subsequently, falling real costs of photocopying due to technological
progress further increased the incentive to engage in illegal copying.  Because the cost of
photocopying includes the time of the person who does the copying, the vastly faster photocopiers
that were introduced in the 1980s made illegal duplication more attractive.  Thus, technological
progress in photocopying constitutes a separate factor that drives down average circulation and
increases subscription prices for libraries, much in the same fashion as does interlibrary loan.
Duplication of publications by even the most efficient photocopiers is usually inefficient.
Its inefficiency depends on the relationship between m and c.  In general, photocopying costs
(including the time of the photocopier) are greater than the marginal cost of printing and distributing
one more copy.  But for the vast majority of scholarly journals, the reader usually does not want to
read everything.  If the reader places little or no value on most of the contents of a journal, copying
a few desired items can be cheaper than paying even the marginal distribution cost for a copy of the
journal.  Consider the example above of a journal that costs, say, $3 per issue to print and to
distribute (not counting first-copy costs).  Suppose that the cost of photocopying is $.10 per page for
the photocopier plus ten seconds per page in the time of the person doing the duplicating.  If this
person earns $15 per hour, this adds about 4 cents per page for copying.  Then, photocopying an
entire 120 page journal would cost $10 for photocopying plus $5 in employee costs, or $15, which17
is far more than the marginal cost of one more issue of the journal.  But photocopying one six page
article costs $.60 in photocopying plus one minute of employee time (another $.25).  Thus, if a
scholar wants to read one short article per issue, it is cheaper in total social costs to photocopy the
article than to print one more copy of the entire journal.
Of course, publishers are unlikely to make some arrangement with a scholar to permit this
can of efficient duplication.  A publisher would have no incentive to make such an arrangement
unless it could recover some of the first-copy costs from users of this type.  In attempting to set a
price above the actual costs of duplication, the publisher would drive the cost of legal duplication
too high in relation to the cost of illegal duplication, at least for users with a small disutility for
illegal duplication.  In addition, the cost of negotiating separate deals to allow copying could well
exceed the cost saving from user photocopying.  Hence, in a manner parallel to the fundamental
inefficiency of average-cost pricing for all information products, efficient user duplication is likely
to be impossible to achieve legally.
IV.  The Consequences of New Information Technology
A common belief among library administrators and other potential users of electronic media
for the distribution of scholarly publications is that the information superhighway offers prospects
for solving the problems of escalating journal publication costs.  In the framework of the analysis
presented here, this belief is almost certainly incorrect.
The only source of cost savings from electronic distribution of scholarly publication is in the
cost of storing and accessing publications.  Electronic distribution will still need to cover the same18
first-copy costs associated with reviewing manuscripts and editing he final product.  Whereas
computer technology has reduced first-copy costs, these savings do not depend on how the
publications is distributed.  A recent study (Bowen 1995) estimates that storage costs are about $2
per year per book or journal, and that reshelving hard copies after use costs about another $1.  When
added to the few dollars of printing and distributing hard copies, these savings are substantial
compared to institutional subscription prices only for journals that are rather extensively used.  Most
likely, for most journals and books, the savings arising from electronic publication, at best, would
equal one year's rise in the average cost of publications.
In addition, electronic publication reduces the cost of illegal duplication, for it avoids the cost
of photocopying.  If a reader wants a hard copy of an article, printing and electronic file and
photocopying hard copy have about the same costs;  however, the costs of storing illegal copies
electronically is low, so these costs can be avoided if a hard copy is not needed.
An interesting issue arises with respect to the ease of detection of electronic copying.  At
present, methods for protecting software are not very secure, but they become more so in the future,
in which detection might be easier than it is now for either photocopying or pirating software.  But
once a user has access to a legal electronic copy, willful duplication for others is almost impossible
to detect unless the copy is stored on the hardware of a computer that is connected to a public
network.  Legal access can be gained by a single legal electronic subscription or by a hard copy
subscription and a scanner.  My tentative conclusion is that electronic duplication is potentially as
important an innovation as photocopying in terms of its effects on illegal copying.  If so, it will cause
legal subscriptions to decline and, consequently, institutional subscription prices to increase.  Hence,19
electronic publication will add to, not subtract from, the financial problems of libraries and the
inefficiency of the distribution process among institutions, where illegal acquisition and copying is
easier to detect and is subject to harsher penalties.
In addition, electronic publishing will certainly increase the range of feasible methods of
producing scholarly product.  For example, it will vastly reduce the cost of including data sets, full
motion video, and nonlinear textual material.  All of these are likely to be valuable additions from
the perspective of disseminating scholarly information.  But they are also likely to increase the first-
copy costs of publications by making publications longer and more complex.  If so, electronic
publication will increase, not reduce, the financial pressures on libraries and the inefficiencies arising
from the pricing structure of scholarly publications.
Even without illegal duplication, electronic distribution threatens publishers.  Many scholars
already post preliminary versions of their publications on the World Wide Web.  Potential readers
can make use of the screening and classification features of he publication process by simply
consulting the advertising material of the publishers, listing recent books and the contents of
journals.  After using this material, readers can then bypass the publisher by downloading the
manuscript from the author's Web site, and perfectly legally bypass the publication process -- and
the payment of a share of the editorial costs of the publisher.
A common reaction to these problems is simply that groups of scholars can band together to
publish "approved" lists of manuscripts that are available on the Internet, thereby avoiding the needs
for journals altogether.  Whereas such groups, whether informally organized or a formal board of
editors, may well emerge, they will not change the fundamental problem.  This concept amounts to20
a proposal to shift the first-copy costs to groups of volunteer scholars, and it will succeed only if the
editorial inputs of publishers (such as copy editing and marketing) are of little value, and if the inputs
of scholarly editors (such as providing in-depth refereeing and detailed suggestions for improvement)
either are also of little value or will be supplied without remuneration.  None of these requirements
seems particularly plausible, for if they were, journals would already have eliminated the services
of little value and/or moved to rely exclusively on volunteer services.
9
V.  Conclusions
The preceding analysis leads to several important conclusions.
The first is that in the absence of relatively secure methods for preventing unauthorized
access and duplication, publishers are not likely to embrace electronic publication of existing
scholarly products because it offers little prospective cost saving but a considerable threat in terms
of increased illegal duplication.  The ripest prospects for electronic distribution are either new types
of publications that make use of the new technical capabilities of digital communication or historical
documents that have little future market value.  Even so, journals, especially, are in trouble, as
scholars place working papers on the Internet and make them freely available.  Internet access is
likely to be used to some degree as a substitute for the purchase of final publications by business and
libraries, which will further erode average circulation of journals.
Second, the financial problems of major libraries are unlikely to be ameliorated by electronic
technology.  Libraries can capture savings in storage and circulation costs by shifting to electronic
copies, but these are small for all but the most heavily circulated publications.  And, working in the21
opposite direction, electronic publication is likely to increase the institutional price for legal access
because few individuals will subscribe as more engage in illegal copying.
Third, because electronic publication will lead to more illegal duplication and innovations
that take advantage of the quality-enhancing capabilities of electronic media, ratio of first-copy costs
to total costs of scholarly publications will rise.  As a result, the prices of publications will also
increase, so that the inefficiencies of the scholarly publication market -- in particular,
undercirculation to institutional subscribers -- will get worse.
Fourth, from a societal perspective, electronic publication and more widespread circulation
should be encouraged.  The best means for accomplishing this objective is subsidization of the fixed
cost of publication, so that publishers would need to rely on subscriptions only to recover
distribution costs.  Unfortunately, subsidies are not easy to implement:  how would the subsidizing
institution determine whether a publication deserved a subsidy?  Most likely, any system for
allocating subsidies would depend on some sort of peer review process to evaluate publications, and
would therefore be likely to erect barriers to entry of new journals.
In the context of the underlying market for scholarly publications, electronic technology
raises many interesting and formidable problems.  While electronic media offer exciting new
prospects for expanding the form of publication, and can offer some real cost savings, they may
aggravate the economic problems that have already arisen in scholarly publication.22
References
Association of Research Libraries (1989).  Of Making Books There Is No End.  Washington:
Association of Research Libraries.
Bowen, W. G. (1995).  JSTOR and the Economics of Scholarly Communication.  Unpublished
manuscript.  New York:  Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
Marks, K. E., Nielsen, S. P., Petersen, H. C., and Wagner, P. E. (1991).  Longitudinal Study of
Scientific Journal Prices in a Research Library.  College and Research Libraries (1991), 125-
138.
Hamaker, C., and Tagler, J. (1988).  The Least Reading for the Smallest Number at the Highest
Price.  American Libraries, 18 American Libraries 18, 764.
Noll, R. G. (1993).  The Economics of Information:  A User's Guide.  The Knowledge Economy:
Annual Review of the Institute for Information Studies . Wye, MD:  Aspen Institute.
Noll, R. G., Peck, M. J., and McGowan, J. J. (1973).  Economic Aspects of Television Regulation.
Washington:  Brookings.
Noll, R. G., and Steinmueller, W. E. (1992).  An Economic Analysis of Scientific Journal Prices:
Preliminary Results.   Serials Review, 18 (1992), 32-37.
Owen, B. M. (1975).   Economics and Freedom of Expression.   Lexington, MA:  Ballinger.
Owen, B. M., and Wildman, S. S. (1992).  Video Economics  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University
Press.
Pencavel, J. (1992) Comments on 'The Journals of Economics' by George J. Stigler, Stephen M.
Stigler, and Claire Friedland.  Presented at Centennial Anniversary Conference on Scholarly
Communication, University of Chicago.
Selsky, D. (1988).  Librarians Face Continued Price Increases of Books and Periodicals.  Library
Journal 118 (September 15), 28.
Spence, A. M., and Owen, B. M. (1977).  "Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and
Welfare."  Quarterly Journal of Economics 91, 103-26.23
Takeyama, L (1994a).  The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual
Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities.  Journal of Industrial Economics
4, 155-66.
Takeyama, L. (1994b).  The Shareware Industry:  Some Stylized Facts and Estimates of Rates of
Return.  Economics of Innovation and New Technology 3, 161-74.
Tuttle, M. (1990).  The Pricing of British Journals for the North American Market.  Library
Resources and Technical Services, 30 (January-March), 72-78.24
1.    The economics of scholarly publications is a special case of the economics of information.
See, for example, Owen  (1975) and Noll, Peck, and McGowan (1973).  For an explanation of
the economics of information products for noneconomists, see Noll (1993).
2.    For example, the top ten percent of scholarly journals in economics account for 88% of all
citations, and 74% of economics journals have never received a single citation in any of the top
eleven journals.  See Pencavel (1992).
3.    The following argument closely parallels the economics of pay television.  See Spence and
Owen (1977).
4.    The discussion that follows was first developed with respect to competition in broadcasting
by Peter O. Steiner.  For a recent comprehensive statement of this approach to understanding
competition in the media, see Owen and Wildman (1992).
5.    The basic facts about prices, costs and circulation reported here are based on my research
in collaboration with Lisa L. Cameron and W. Edward Steinmueller.  A summary of the
information about prices and circulation is contained in Noll and  Steinmueller (1992).  A more
detailed econometric study is in preparation.  In addition, see Marks, Nielsen, Petersen, and
Wagner (1991).
6.    For example, see Association of Research Libraries (1989);  Selsky, (1988); Tuttle (1990);
and Hamaker and Tagler (1988).
7.    There is good evidence that the distaste for extensive illegal duplication is significant.  For
example, some very popular and profitable computer software is distributed as "shareware."
That is, the software is given away for free on computer bulletin boards or on published articles,
or is sold at roughly the cost of duplication on diskettes.  Users are then asked to pay the license
fee (usually in the range of $25 to $100) only if, after testing the program, they decide to use it
permanently.  Because enforcement of the intellectual property rights in shareware is essentially
impossible, these payments are voluntary, yet a very large number of people pay them.  See
Takeyama (1994a).
8.    Some copiers would never subscribe because they value the publication at less than P, but
more than the cost of illegal copying.  These people do not harm the publisher by illegally
copying the material.  In the case of scholarly publications, some illegal copying actually can
enhance the value of the publication to the publisher if it increases citation, and hence the
reputation and visibility, of the publication (Takeyama 1994b).  This effect can be important for
journals, where cumulative past citations are likely to affect the demand for subscriptions.
Notes25
9.    Margaret Jane Radin, in commenting on an earlier version of this paper, pointed out that the
vast majority of law reviews are edited almost entirely by uncompensated students.  She also
observed that, judging from the results, this example is not one that other disciplines should rush
to follow.